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Economic Benefit Assignment in Environmental
Cost Allocation: Toward a Suggestion Model
Collins C. Ngwakwe
This paper aims to suggest a model to reward a ‘dirty product’ which
has the potential to oﬀer sales promotion services to other ‘clean prod-
ucts’ in a multiple product firm. The paper suggests a model – eco-
nomic benefit assignment (eba) for apportionment of direct waste
costs where a polluting product oﬀers a sales promotion benefit to other
‘clean products’ of the same company, which proposes that benefiting
products should be assigned a proportion of the direct waste cost of
the polluting product (as a service charge) based on the proportion of
promotion benefit (sales benefit) received from the polluting product.
The idea is that, based on transfer pricing theory, such promotion ser-
vice would be paid for, if oﬀered by an outside agent. Whilst academic
debate is expected to ensue from this suggestion model, further case
research is imperative to demonstrate industrial applicability.
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Introduction
Contemporary pressure for corporate environmental responsibility has
caused reforms in costing systems to properly account for environmen-
tal costs. Popular methodology to achieve transformation is rooted on
polluter pays principle Stenis and Hogland (2002) in which the polluting
department is meant to bear its polluting costs by applying the activ-
ity based costing (abc) system (Kreuze and Gale 1994). Thus, improve-
ment in traditional costing system has contributed to improving divi-
sional performance evaluation and incentive schemes in decentralised
organisations such as in multiple product firms (Cooper and Kaplan
1988a). This is a notable contribution as divisional performance and in-
centive schemes depend on eﬀective cost allocation and transfer pric-
ing (Baiman and Rajan 2002). However, although rationally, a pollut-
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ing product should take responsibility for associated environmental cost;
this paper attempts to present a simple case of an intangible valuable ser-
vice which a polluting product may oﬀer to clean products of the same
firm, and which may warrant possible sharing of an established direct
waste costs of a ‘dirty’ product amongst benefiting products.
Consequently, the paper is guided by these questions: can direct waste
costs of a ‘dirty’ product be possibly shared amongst multiple products,
which derive sales promotion benefit from a ‘dirty’ product, and what
possible method can be used for such allocation? Therefore, the objec-
tive of this paper is to use a simple case to explain how an acclaimed
‘dirty’ product may oﬀer sales promotion service to ‘clean’ products in
a multiple product firm; and to suggest a possible model to allocate the
direct waste cost of a ‘dirty’ product to benefiting products.
The paper is organised as follows: the second section presents a brief
conceptual background. The third section is the methodology, presen-
tation and analysis of data. The fourth section presents the suggestion
model. Finally, the fifth section concludes the paper.
Brief Conceptual Background
Revolution in business cost accounting system emerged in the late 1980s
when famous American authors – Robin Cooper and Robert S. Ka-
plan posited that the conventional costing system requires adjustment to
cope with contemporary trends in manufacturing technology and mar-
ket conditions (Cooper and Kaplan 1988b). Corporate environmental
stewardship has benefit from such innovation in costing system; it as-
sists in tracing environmental costs to responsible products in a multiple
product firm. However, complex interactions amongst multiple prod-
ucts may at times hinder objective performance evaluation in a mul-
tiple product firm. Such interactions may occur in firms’ market en-
vironment. For instance according to Cooper and Kaplan; ‘many cus-
tomers value a single source of supply.’ Consequently, a company may
not simply drop a product line because it is unprofitable (Cooper and
Kaplan 1988b); they posit that a product line, even when unprofitable,
may boost the performance of other products in a multiple product
firm. Hence, objective evaluation of a product performance in relation
to other products is vital in building incentives to enhance the eﬃciency
of activity centres (Vieira and Pereira 2010). However, objective perfor-
mance evaluation may depend on objective cost allocation. Therefore,
some authors have examined the fairness in internal cost allocation; for
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instance, Choudhury (1990) examine cost allocation ‘from the perspec-
tive of intra-firm distributive justice’ and highlights that unfair cost al-
location may cause redistribution of profit and rewards between organi-
sational subunits. Nevertheless, if the controllability principle in cost al-
location is adhered to, the uncontrollable factors in performance assess-
ment is neutralised and thus instils fairness in performance evaluation
(Giraud, Langevin and Carla 2008; Cohen, Loebn and Stark 1992).
Therefore, it is argued that cost allocation should be consistent with
the goal of the firm. Thus, the Oregon Metro (2010, 3) stresses that:
The cost allocation must balance equity with the agency mission,
policies and objectives. When possible, costs should follow a cause
and eﬀect link to why the cost was incurred.
Similarly, according to AustralianWater Corporation (2011) waste cost
allocation should be based on ‘equity (no cross-subsidisation), full cost
recovery, and user pays charging.’ Hence, Choudhury (1990) maintain
that when performance rewards and/or incentives are based on prof-
its, cost allocation should therefore be approached from the point of
‘intra-firm distributive justice’ to ensure the existence of fairness in cost
allocation (Choudhury 1990, 217). Choudhury’s assertion is confirmed
by Horngren et al. (2010, 415) where they maintain that many compa-
nies are using return on investment (roi) as performance measure be-
cause it is less complicated for the understanding ofmanagers. Therefore,
given that roi is calculated based on net operating income, it means that
wrong apportionment of operations’ cost would produce distorted net
operating income, and would lead managers into wrong performance
evaluation and decisions. Managers’ focus on tracking and allocation of
costs should not be limited only to conventional costs within the direct
and indirect category. Managers should look beyond these known costs
and investigate hidden interactions amongst products outside the firm
that result in abnormal services and benefits. If such interactions are not
made to reflect in cost allocation problems such as in waste costs, there
may be potential asymmetry in cost allocation.
To avoid possible bias in cost allocation especially as regards environ-
mental costs, a close attention needs to be given to the performance of
a product that is considered ‘dirty’ in a multiple product firm. In the
simple case presented in subsequent pages, a ‘dirty’ product appears to
be promoting the sales of ‘clean’ products in a multiple product firm.
Therefore, the paper suggests that objective evaluation of product perfor-
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mance in this company should recognise the obscured sales promotion
service oﬀered by the ‘dirty’ product. Although activity based costing
has been eﬀective in environmental cost allocation; it may not be ‘inher-
ently positive’ in all cases (Englund and Gerdin 2008); in relation to this
Kallunki and Silvola (2008) argue that internal and external characteris-
tics of firms may influence the phase of using the abc system. This im-
plies that abc may not be suitable in all stages of a product or firm’s life
cycle and/or specific conditions given the impact of internal and exter-
nal factors including customer purchase habit and management’s mar-
keting priority. This is because in some conditions such as in waste cost
allocation problems, whilst abc allocates direct waste costs to a respon-
sible product, such direct waste cost may be obscurely driven by man-
agement decision beyond the control of departmental manager. This is
exemplified in this case where the management of wbc Company desires
to boost sales of ‘clean’ products in a multiple product firm by increas-
ing the production of a ‘dirty’ product in order to stock enough quantity
of ‘dirty’ product in the stores, which the management of wbc believes
motives customers to purchase the ‘clean’ products. This is based on the
firm’s experience that the ‘dirty’ product’s quality endears it to customers
and that such patronage is transferred to other products of the firmwhen
stocked together in the stores. However, the cost allocation implication,
notably, direct waste costs seem to be eluding the attention of wbc man-
agers.
This paper proposes that such hidden service by a ‘dirty’ product de-
serve recognition, which conventionally should be priced in consonance
with the transfer pricing objectives (Bailey and Boe 1976; Bailey and
Collins 2005; Baldenius 2006). However, given complex marketing in-
teraction existing between the multiple products in this case; further re-
search is imperative to find possible internal transfer scheme for such
obscure and valuable service from a polluting product. Whilst await-
ing a suitable internal pricing scheme, a cost allocation model may help
to apportion fairly the extra load of direct waste cost triggered by the
clean products’ reliance on the ‘dirty’ product’s sales promotion service.
This paper suggests a model, which suggests that management account-
ing deserve dynamic innovation (Emsley 2005; Sweeting and Kellet 1991)
given growing influence of social and environmental factors in produc-
tion planning, operations and marketing. The implication is that cost
and management accounting systems would continue on a progressive
modernization track in conformity with novel challenges arising from
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social, environmental and climate change. The case summary, which is a
foundation for the suggestionmodel, is briefly presented in the following
pages.
Methodology
This suggestion model of environmental cost allocation is based on a
six months market study of consumer purchase habit on products man-
ufactured by wbc Company, a multiple product firm in Nigeria. It is
also supported by an administration of short questionnaire to buyers of
wbc products. In the paragraphs that follow, the market study data is
presented and analysed; this is followed by a simple regression test, and
subsequently an analysis of the questionnaire is presented to substantiate
results.
wbc Company (a pseudo name) in place of the real company name,
manufactures four products weavon, soap, cream, and perfect finish.
Weavon is an artificial ladies’ hair, acclaimed to be ‘dirty’ because of
much waste involved in the manufacturing process. The company is con-
sidered suitable for this study because it is a typical example of a multi-
ple product firm whose products exhibit two characteristics referred to
in this paper as ‘dirty’ and ‘clean’. It aroused research interest because the
‘dirty’ product (weavon), although operating at a loss is still retained by
the firm. According to the marketing manager:
We keep weavon in operation because it helps to retain our mar-
ket share in the other three products – soap, cream and perfect fin-
ish, and occasionally we increase production volume of weavon to
maintain stock in the stores to boost the sales of other products.
With the support of wbc Company, a simple market observation in
five diﬀerent retail shops was carried out from January to June 2010 to
confirm the marketing manager’s claim, and to suggest possible cost im-
plications. Weavon – the ‘dirty’ product was placed in the stores for three
months and was also removed from the stores for three months in an
alternating fashion. However, the clean products – soap, cream, and per-
fect finish were kept in the stores throughout the six months observation.
The aim is to ascertain whether the presence of the dirty product in the
stores actually promotes the sales of the clean products and whether the
sales volume of clean products may decrease if the dirty product is out
of stock. Furthermore, direct waste cost implication on weavon due to
increase in volume of production is obtained from the cost accounting
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table 1 January, ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ products are placed together, sales volume of clean
products is observed and recorded
Item Shop 1 Shop 2 Shop 3 Shop 4 Shop 5 Total
Soap 400 300 200 350 220 1470
Cream 500 400 300 420 350 1970
Perfect finish 450 420 350 400 300 1920
table 2 February, ‘clean’ products are placed together excluding the dirty product,
volume of sales for the ‘clean’ products are observed and recorded
Item Shop 1 Shop 2 Shop 3 Shop 4 Shop 5 Total
Soap 200 120 100 150 120 690
Cream 250 180 140 200 150 920
Perfect finish 220 200 120 180 140 860
table 3 March, ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ products are placed together, sales volume of clean
products is observed and recorded
Item Shop 1 Shop 2 Shop 3 Shop 4 Shop 5 Total
Soap 410 280 210 340 200 1440
Cream 520 410 305 400 360 1995
Perfect finish 460 440 370 410 320 2000
department of the wbc Company, and a methodology for allocation to
benefiting products is suggested. The focus is on direct waste cost since
according to the production manager:
Heavy cleaning and washing of raw cotton and wool during the pro-
duction of weavon enhances its admirable quality which we believe
endears weavon to the patronage of our consumers.
Tables 1–6 show the sales performance of ‘clean’ products of the wbc
Company when the ‘dirty’ product was placed and removed in stores
with the ‘clean’ products in alternating fashion between January and June
2010.
presentation and analysis of market study
Tables 1–6 present the result of a six-month market study, which reveals
that ‘clean’ products experience increase in sales volume if stocked to-
gether with the ‘dirty’ product, and that clean products experience de-
creased sales volume when the ‘dirty’ product is out of stock.
Tables 1, 3, and 5 present the sales volume of clean products whilst
weavon was in store, with associated volumes of 5360, 5435, and 5570 re-
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table 4 April, products are placed together excluding the dirty product, volume of
sales for the ‘clean’ products are observed and recorded
Item Shop 1 Shop 2 Shop 3 Shop 4 Shop 5 Total
Soap 180 130 105 140 115 670
Cream 260 200 150 205 170 985
Perfect finish 230 210 130 185 150 905
table 5 May, ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ products are placed together, sales volume of clean
products is observed and recorded
Soap 420 300 230 360 240 1550
Cream 510 405 315 420 380 2030
Perfect finish 440 450 360 400 340 1990
table 6 June, products are placed together excluding the dirty product, volume of
sales for the ‘clean’ products are observed and recorded
Soap 190 150 110 130 125 705
Cream 280 220 170 215 190 1075
Perfect finish 210 205 125 180 160 880
table 7 Summary of sales volume of clean products
Sales volume with weavon in stores Sales volume without weavon in stores
5360 2470
5435 2560
5570 2660
spectively. On the other hand, tables 2, 4 and 6 contain sales volume of
the clean products whilst weavon was removed from the stores. Associ-
ated sales volumes recordedwere 2470, 2560, and 2660 respectively. These
sales volumes are summarised in table 7.
Physical observation of the above scenario indicates clear diﬀerence in
the sales volume under the two conditions. A t-test of diﬀerence inmeans
is employed to check statistically, if one can assert that a diﬀerence exists
amongst the two observations of sales volume under the two conditions.
The t-test is presented in table 8.
The t-test of diﬀerence in means show a diﬀerence in means between
the two observations as the t-statistics is greater that the hypothesised
mean (0). Therefore, one may conclude that the presence of weavon in
stores influences the sale of other products of the wbc Company.
Additionally, a simple regression test is conducted to ascertain whether
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table 8 t-test: Paired two sample for means (sales of other products with weavon in
stores and without weavon in stores)
Item With weavon Without weavon
Mean 5455 2563.333333
Variance 11325 9033.333333
Observations 3 3
Pearson correlation 0.991154274
Hypothesized Mean Diﬀerence 0
df 2
t-statistics 285.232243
P(T ≤ t) one-tail 6.14561e−6
t critical one-tail 2.91998558
P(T ≤ t) two-tail 1.22912e−5
t critical two-tail 4.30265273
table 9 Sales volume of weavon and clean products during the months of placing
weavon in stores
Months Sales volume of weavon Sales volume of clean products
January 5000 3560
March 5200 5435
May 5300 5570
the sales volume of weavon has a relationship with the movement in
sales volume of the ‘clean’ products. The production and sales volumes of
weavon is obtained from the marketing division of wbc for the months
of January, March and May – the periods during which weavon was
placed in stores alongside with the ‘clean’ products. The sales volumes
of weavon constitute the independent variables (x). On the other hand,
the sales volume of the clean products for the months of January, March,
and May are used as the dependent variables (y). These volumes are pre-
sented in table 9 and are followed by a simple regression test in table 10.
The regression statistics also indicate a significant relationship between
sales volume of weavon and the sales volume of clean products.
presentation and analysis of questionnaire
To ascertain whether other factors (apart from weavon) contribute to in-
fluence buyers’ decision to purchase other products of wbc whilst pur-
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table 10 Summary of regression output
Regression statistics Multiple R 0.986640939
R2 0.973460342
Adjusted R2 0.473460342
Standard error 985.8255858
Observations 3
anova df SS MS F Sig. F
Regression 1 71294021 71294021 73.358921 0.0739932
Residual 2 1943704.2 971852.09
Total 3 73237725
Item Coeﬀ. Std.
error
t-stat. P-value Lower
95%
Upper
95%
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
Intercept 0 #n/a #n/a #n/a #n/a #n/a #n/a #n/a
chasing weavon, a short questionnaire was administered to buyers based
on two key issues: to elicit buyers’ opinion on whether they actually pur-
chase other products (clean products) of wbc whilst purchasing weavon
(dirty product) and to ascertain from buyers if other factors (besides
weavon) influence their decision to purchase other wbc products as they
visit the stores to purchase weavon. In consideration of existing public
apathy to research questions, the questionnaire was limited to six ques-
tions to motivate willing buyers to respond to the questions fast within
few minutes before or after doing their shopping. The two key issues
upon which the questions were centred are:
i Whether the presence of weavon in the stores engenders buyers’ de-
cision to purchase other products of wbc, (questions 1–2).
ii If taste, fashion, quality, and price influence buyers’ decision to pur-
chase the clean products wbc as they visit the stores.
In section (i) of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to check
their preferred box to indicate whether they actually purchase other
products of wbc while purchasing weavon; and the responses are anal-
ysed in tables 11 to 12.
In section (ii) of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to check
their preferred box to indicate the extent to which other factors (fashion,
taste price, quality) influence their decision to purchase the clean prod-
ucts of wbc. They were instructed that checking (disagree and strongly
disagree) would denote that they purchase clean products because of
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table 11 Question 1: I usually purchase other products of wbc when I buy weavon
Item Frequency Percent Valid percent Cum. percent
Strongly agree 700 87.5 87.5 87.5
Agree 80 10.0 10.0 97.5
Undecided 16 2.0 2.0 99.5
Disagree 4 0.5 0.5 100.0
table 12 Question 2: I purchase a combination of wbc products because of the good
quality of weavon
Item Frequency Percent Valid percent Cum. percent
Strongly agree 720 90.0 90.0 90.0
Agree 50 6.3 6.3 96.3
Undecided 25 3.1 3.1 99.4
Disagree 5 0.6 0.6 100.0
table 13 Question 3: I purchase a combination of wbc products because it is a
reigning fashion to have such combination
Item Frequency Percent Valid percent Cum. percent
Strongly agree 4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Agree 6 0.8 0.8 1.3
Undecided 50 6.3 6.3 7.5
Disagree 10 1.3 1.3 8.8
Strongly disagree 730 91.3 91.3 100.0
their desire for weavon. The objective of questions 3–6 was to ascer-
tain from buyers whether (in addition to weavon) other factors such as
(taste, fashion, quality and price) contribute to influence their decision
to purchase the clean products whilst purchasing weavon. The summary
of questions 3–6 show that only 5% of buyers agreed that taste, fashion,
quality and price (and other undecided eﬀects) influence their decision
to purchase the ‘clean products’ of the wbc as they purchased weavon.
However, 9.5%disagreed that these other factors influence their decision,
which is interpreted to mean that the purchase of weavon is a major fac-
tor that influences buyers’ choice to also buy other products of wbc (re-
spondents were instructed that checking [disagree and strongly disagree
boxes] would denote that they purchase clean products because of their
desire for weavon).
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table 14 Question 4: I purchase a combination of wbc products because it is my taste
Item Frequency Percent Valid percent Cum. percent
Strongly agree 3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Agree 5 0.6 0.6 1.0
Undecided 40 5.0 5.0 6.0
Disagree 8 1.0 1.0 7.0
Strongly disagree 744 93.0 93.0 100.0
table 15 Question 5: I purchase a combination of wbc products because it is a
cheaper option compared to other similar products in the market
Item Frequency Percent Valid percent Cum. percent
Strongly agree 4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Agree 6 0.75 0.75 1.25
Undecided 10 1.3 1.3 2.55
Disagree 10 1.3 1.3 3.85
Strongly disagree 770 96.3 96.3 100.0
table 16 Question 6: I purchase a combination of wbc products because all the
products have good quality
Item Frequency Percent Valid percent Cum. percent
Strongly agree 1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Agree 5 0.62 0.62 0.72
Undecided 25 3.1 3.1 3.72
Disagree 50 6.3 6.3 10.02
Strongly disagree 719 89.9 89.9 100.0
table 17 The extent to which other factors (fashion, taste price, quality) influence
sale of wbc’s clean products
Factors (1) (2) (3) (4) Total Frequency Percentage
Other factors 60 48 20 31 159 5%
Weavon as a factor 740 752 780 769 3041 95%
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) fashion, (2) taste, (3) price, (4) quality.
Other factors: (taste, fashion, quality, and price): strongly agree + agree + undecided;
weavon as a factor: disagree + strongly disagree.
The preceding results closely echoes the wbc’s marketing manager’s
claim that their customers purchase other products of wbc whilst pur-
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table 18 Total volume of weavon produced from January to June 2010 with
associated increase in direct waste costs
Item January February March April May June
Volume produced 5000 5100 5200 5250 5300 5400
Direct waste cost (000) N100 N110 N130 N150 N155 N162
chasing weavon and that the absence of the ‘dirty’ product in the stores
causes low sales of these other products. Consequently, given the market
interactions between weavon (‘dirty product’) and ‘clean products’ of the
wbc Company explored in the preceding sections; the author submits
that such interactions (give and take services) although obscured, have
concealed waste cost implications for the production of the dirty prod-
uct (weavon). The suggested cost implication and corresponding sugges-
tion model to approach a fair allocation of such cost are discussed in the
subsequent sections.
Towards a SuggestionModel of Allocation of Increase in Direct
Waste Costs of theWeavon (‘Dirty Product’)
Information from the production department shows an increase in the
production of weavon, which according to the marketing manager is
meant to keep enough quantity of weavon in the stores to promote the
sales of other products. The crux of this paper is that this increase pro-
pels an increase in the direct waste cost of weavon, which could not have
arisen if normal production quantity of weavon was maintained. Hence,
this paper argues that since this increase in production of weavon and
associated increase in direct waste cost is driven by the management’s
desire to promote the sales of other products. Therefore, weavon should
not be held responsible for the increase in the direct waste costs since it
is beyond the control of weavon department. Consequently, it may be
objective to assign the increase in direct waste cost of weavon to the ben-
efiting products according to the ratio of benefit derived (i. e. increase
in the sales volume of ‘clean’ products) which results from stocking the
‘dirty’ product in stores. The increase in volume of weavon produced due
to management decision and associated increase in direct waste cost for
January to June is presented in table 18.
Using the month of January as the base year, the increase in direct
waste cost associated with increase in the volume (table 18) of weavon is:
N10000 + N20000 + N20000 + N5000 + N7000 = N62000.
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table 19 Calculation of increase in sales volume of clean products resulting from
keeping the ‘dirty’ product in stores
Sales volume for soap whilst weavon is in stock 4460
– Sales volume for soap excluding weavon in stock – 2065
= Total increase in sales volume = 2395
Sales volume for cream whilst weavon is in stock 5995
– Sales volume for cream excluding weavon in stock – 2980
= Total increase in sales volume = 3015
Sales volume for soap whilst perfect finish is in stock 5910
– Sales volume for soap excluding perfect finish in stock – 2645
= Total increase in sales volume = 3265
= Total = 8675
The Suggestion Model of Allocation, Economic Benefit Assignment
(eba), is based on the ratio of promotion benefit derived in relation to
other clean products:
EBA =
ISVa
TISVcp
IDWCd, (1)
where ISVa = increase in the sales volume of a clean product, TISVcp
= total increase in sales volume of the three clean products, IDWCd =
increase in direct waste costs of dirty product (weavon).
However, in consideration of other potential factors that may influ-
ence buyers’ choice (aside of weavon) to purchase the ‘clean’ products of
wbc, the model above is adjusted to accommodate such other factors.
For instance, buyers were asked to rate the influence of (taste, fashion,
quality, and price) on their decision to purchase other products of wbc
whilst purchasing weavon (see table 17).
Hence, taste, fashion, quality and price, and any other potential factor
apart from the presence of weavon are termed as Fa−z. Therefore, they
are used to adjust the model as (1 − Fa−z):
EBA =
ISVa
TISVcp
IDWCd(1 − Fa−z), (2)
where Fa−z = other factors (apart from weavon) influencing the purchase
of clean products, measured in percentage.
Table 17 shows that aggregate percentage of other factors (taste, fash-
ion, quality and price) which influence buyers’ choice to purchase wbc’s
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‘clean’ products is about 5%. Therefore, the model is applied to allocate
the increased direct waste cost of weavon as follows:
EBA =
ISVa
TISVcp
IDWCd(1 − 0.05),
soap =
2395
8675
N62000(1 − 0.05) = N16261,
cream =
3015
8675
N62000(1 − 0.05) = N20470,
perfect finish =
3265
8675
N62000(1 − 0.05) = N22168.
From the market study presented in this paper, the ‘dirty’ product
(weavon) is found to boost the sales of the other ‘clean’ products in
the market, thereby oﬀering an obscured sales promotion service to the
‘clean’ products, but this relationship appears to be neglected by man-
agement. This unrecognised service oﬀered by the ‘dirty’ product gives
rise to two conditions: the sales promotion service (though hidden) is
unrewarded and the ‘dirty’ product continues to shoulder the burden of
increasing direct waste costs associated with increased production vol-
ume of ‘dirty’ product which is strategically increased by management to
sustain the sales of the clean products. Since the increase in production
volume of weavon and increase in direct waste cost is beyond the con-
trol of weavon department, the above model apportions the amount of
increase in direct waste costs (N62000) to the clean products according
to the ratio of sales volume increase in relation to other benefiting prod-
ucts. Hence, weavon is freed from the burden of additional direct waste
cost which it is not actually responsible to. The author suggest that such
allocation would allow equity and fairness in waste cost allocation, and
may impact on product costs and prices of both products of wbc. Fur-
thermore, it may also impact fairly on performance evaluation. Overall,
such fair allocation would incentivise weavon department toward con-
tinual eﬀort in its cleaner manufacturing processes and in upholding its
product quality.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has attempted to suggest a model to reward a ‘dirty product’
which has the potential to oﬀer sales promotion services to other ‘clean
products’ in a multiple product firm. It is based on a simple case of a six
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months market study in five retail cosmetic shops. Consumer purchase
preference was observed on ‘clean’ products made by wbc Company as
the ‘dirty’ product was made to be on and out of stock in the stores in an
alternating fashion.
It is found that the polluting product of the company – weavon (‘dirty
product’), attracts consumers to patronize other three products (‘clean
products’) of wbc amidst other substitute brands by other companies in
the same shops. It is also found that the quality of weavon – the ‘dirty
product’ of wbc Company endears it to consumers and that this patron-
age is transferred to other products of wbc such that if weavon is out of
stock in the shops, the ‘clean products’ experience low sales volume in
contrast to when the ‘dirty product’ is in stock.
This paper argues that since the cost of cleaning and washing of
weavon enhances the ‘dirty’ product’s admirable quality which in turn
favours the ‘clean products’ of the wbc Company. Equity and objec-
tivity in waste cost allocation should mean that the increase in direct
waste costs, although direct to the ‘dirty product,’ be proportionately
assigned to the ‘clean products’ which derive sales promotion benefit
from the ‘dirty product’ according to the ratio of promotion benefit de-
rived. It is argued that this is imperative given that the desire by the wbc
management to place weavon in stores as a booster for other products
increases the production of weavon and also increases the direct waste
costs of weavon, which is beyond the direct control of weavon depart-
ment. Hence, this paper suggests a model – Economic Benefit Assign-
ment (eba) for apportionment of direct waste costs where a polluting
product oﬀers sales promotion benefit to other ‘clean products’ of the
same company, and proposes that, given similar conditions to this case,
benefiting products should be assigned a proportion of the direct waste
cost of the polluting product (as a service charge) based on the pro-
portion of promotion benefit (sales benefit) received from the polluting
product. The idea is that (in consideration of transfer pricing theory)
such promotion service would be paid for, if oﬀered by an outside agent.
Whilst academic debate is expected to ensue from this suggestion model,
further case research is imperative to demonstrate industrial applicabil-
ity. Further study is also recommended to investigate potential implica-
tion for performance evaluation. Such studies are imperative in contem-
porary period where proper environmental cost allocation has become
relevant in divisional performance evaluation and toward incentivising
managers’ innovative practices in cleaner production.
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